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REDEEMING BOND? 
Alison L. LaCroix∗ 
Professor Heather Gerken subjects the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bond v. United States1 to a range of pointed and well-deserved criti-
cisms.  In particular, she notes the circularity of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
statutory analysis, writing that “the Court thought the statute was am-
biguous . . . [b]ecause it had to be.”2  Gerken also characterizes Bond 
as a return to what she terms a “relational” theory of federalism,3 ac-
cording to which the analysis begins with the power of the states.  She 
contrasts this approach with what she suggests is the only other alter-
native offered by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: an analysis that 
“defines federal power in isolation.”4  This federal power–driven ap-
proach “start[s] with Congress and attempt[s] to delineate the bounds 
of its power without reference to the states.”5  In the return to the rela-
tional account, Gerken finds something to praise in Bond (although 
she notes that the Court “takes the wrong path to get there” by focus-
ing on state sovereignty,6 a concept she believes has become “a camp-
fire story”7).  A federalism analysis that starts with the states is clear, 
and it avoids the problem of “how to bound the boundless.”8  In the 
end, then, Gerken endorses Bond as a demonstration that “[b]ad theory 
can make good law or at least halfway decent doctrine” that is  
“reasonably manageable and coherent.”9 
 What Gerken praises the Court for, however, I would argue is a 
pervasive, and now deepening, problem in recent federalism doctrine.  
The “clear statement” rule of Bond10 — which, given that it breaks 
down in the pages of the Court’s muddled ambiguity analysis, Gerken 
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rightly treats as existing only in the Court’s description of what it is 
doing — appears to be a rule directing that federalism analysis begin 
with a search for, and measurement of, the essential localness of the 
particular activity to be regulated.  Unless the relational, state-focused 
account is premised on a substantive commitment to state sovereignty 
itself, however — a view that Gerken clearly does not embrace, as she 
terms it “mostly claptrap”11 — it is not clear why the relational ac-
count is a clearer statement than an Article I–focused approach would 
be.  By itself, the state-focused approach provides no additional ana-
lytical clarity unless it is accompanied by a prior determination of 
which side should win in a contest between federal and state power.   
 If we follow Gerken, however, and disclaim a normative preference 
for strong state sovereignty, we might equally well begin the federalism 
investigation by looking to congressional power.  Starting with Con-
gress’s Article I power does not mean that federal authority is limitless, 
any more than starting with the states’ power means that state author-
ity will always prevail.  So, if the state-focused approach to answering 
federalism questions is not clear, and if one does not endorse a sub-
stantive position of strong state sovereignty, what in the end does 
Bond contribute to the doctrine on federalism? 
In my view, Bond works a significant change in the federalism case 
law, but not precisely in the direction that Gerken suggests.  Gerken 
frames Bond as a crisis averted for more nationalistically inclined 
champions of federalism, and as a salutary opportunity to rethink how 
a state-focused analysis might be applied to federalism cases.  But alt-
hough Bond initially appears to depend on the relationship between 
the state side of the federalism analysis and the congressional side, it 
ultimately turns out to be much more about a judicially defined hier-
archy of congressional powers.  And while the Court labors to conceal 
behind a scrim of statutory interpretation its sweeping structural and 
supra-textual account of why the Chemical Weapons Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1998 does not reach Carol Anne Bond’s conduct, 
it continues its quiet transformation of federalism doctrine. 
I.  LOCALNESS AND THE HIERARCHY OF ARTICLE I POWERS  
Bond demonstrates that a majority of the Court believes that there 
exists a stable category of “purely local” activities.12  We already knew 
this; one need only think back to United States v. Lopez13 and, more 
recently, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius14 
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(NFIB), to see the power of “the local” in federalism analysis.  But 
Bond is different because it shows us the Court formulating a hierar-
chy of congressional powers that turns in part on the strength of this 
localness analysis.  Even Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court, 
which quickly disavows any need to decide a constitutional question,15 
returns repeatedly to the theme of the local.16   
Bond gives us a scale of localness that bears directly on the 
strength of Congress’s powers: the more local the Court deems the ac-
tivity in question, the more barriers the Court will place in the way of 
congressional regulation.  The novelty of Bond is including the power 
to implement treaties among the low-level congressional powers — the 
suspect ones down at the bottom of the hierarchy, where most activi-
ties are local enough to render them largely unregulable by Congress.  
And which power is at the top of the hierarchy?  The Article I power 
without peer, the commerce power: a clause so powerful, a case law so 
problematic, that in case after case, the government has declined even 
to argue its applicability.17  In the end, then, Bond is a case about the 
commerce power. 
To see this, let us return to the two main problems with Bond.  
First, consider the evident — but perhaps deliberate — confusion 
about the basis of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court.  Is it 
“just” a case of statutory construction, or does the decision in fact turn 
on deep constitutional principles?  As Justice Scalia noted in his con-
currence, the Court’s opinion “starts with the federalism-related conse-
quences of the statute’s meaning and reasons backwards, holding that, 
if the statute has what the Court considers a disruptive effect on the 
‘federal-state balance’ of criminal jurisdiction, that effect causes the 
text, even if clear on its face, to be ambiguous.”18  But an equally strik-
ing aspect of the Chief Justice’s opinion — aside from an inexplicably 
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 15 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087 (stating that the “well-established principle . . . that normally the 
Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground on which to dispose 
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McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 16 Id. (referring to “the Constitution’s division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving 
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 17 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) 
(No. 08-1224), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1224.pdf 
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ing down a civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power))); see also LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2072–73 (discussing the role of 
the commerce power in Comstock and other cases). 
 18 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
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sharp tone more characteristic of an angry dissent — is its relentless 
focus on the “purely local” nature of Bond’s activity.19  As Justice Scal-
ia and Professor Gerken both point out, the statute at issue was not 
ambiguous and clearly covered Bond’s conduct.20  Despite the Court’s 
statements about sticking to the statutory issue, however, this undeni-
able foray into constitutional analysis raises the substantive stakes.  
Moreover, it gives the Court the rhetorical ability to conjure and then 
hold at bay another bête noire, an unfettered federal police power — 
the antithesis of a concern for local authority. 
This brings us to Bond’s second and more significant consequence: 
it continues the recent trend of federalism cases in which the Court 
suggests that there is a hierarchy of Article I powers.  In such cases, 
the Court insists on a distinct domain of “purely local” activity that is 
presumptively not federally regulable, and it then measures Congress’s 
power relative to the localness of that domain.21  The Court thus has 
set up a pair of interlocking scales: first, a scale of localness, which in 
turn bears directly on a second scale, the strength of Congress’s Article 
I powers.  This approach stands in sharp contrast to other approaches 
that begin with congressional power, interpret it according to the enu-
meration principle, and treat it as “supreme within its sphere of action” 
before reaching any freestanding concerns about state sovereignty.22  
Under the Court’s new approach, the more local the underlying activi-
ty is deemed, the weaker the respective congressional power in that 
domain must be. 
And, paradoxically, the stronger the congressional power, the hard-
er it has become to actually use.23  Here is where the two scales —  
localness and the hierarchy of congressional powers — interact.  The 
consequence of a finding of localness depends on which of the congres-
sional powers is at stake.24  A finding that a particular activity is par-
adigmatically “local” will outweigh a lower-level Article I power, but it 
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 19 Id. at 2083, 2087, 2090, 2092 (majority opinion).  
 20 See id. at 2094–95 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gerken, supra note 2, at 89–90. 
 21 See generally LaCroix, supra note 4 (discussing cases dealing with the necessary and proper 
and spending powers). 
 22 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251, 278 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I should have thought that the most conspicu-
ous decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other con-
stitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the 
carrying out of the domestic policy of any State.”). 
 23 My colleague Aziz Huq has made a related but distinct argument that the Court has adopt-
ed a “tiers of scrutiny” approach to enumerated powers cases.  See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny 
in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (2013). 
 24 Note that this discussion focuses solely on Congress’s Article I powers.  The question of the 
relative hierarchy of the Article I powers versus Congress’s power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is a distinct issue. 
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might not squelch a regulation under one of the powers that the Court 
increasingly treats as higher-value sources of congressional authority. 
The hierarchy of Article I powers that emerges from the Court’s 
recent decisions proceeds roughly as follows, in order from strongest to 
weakest: commerce power25 (strongest but hardest for Congress to 
use); taxing power26 (somewhat less strong, somewhat easier to use); 
treaty power27 (still usable after Bond, but perhaps less strong than in 
its Missouri v. Holland28 zenith); necessary and proper power29 (least 
strong when used on its own, except for persons in federal custody, 
based on a misreading of McCulloch v. Maryland30).  Indeed, in NFIB, 
the potentially broad scope of the necessary and proper power elicited 
a particularly notable statement of the hierarchical approach to Article 
I from Chief Justice Roberts.31  As I have argued elsewhere, however, 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s use of the phrase “great substantive and 
independent power” in McCulloch32 was not a limit on the use of the 
necessary and proper power,33 but rather a synonym for the phrase 
“powers already explicitly enumerated in Article I.”34  The hierarchical 
approach to congressional power, therefore, is an innovation of the  
recent Court, not a legacy of the early republic. 
Moreover, the higher a particular Article I power ranks in the hier-
archy, the more sedulously the Court polices the boundaries of that 
power.  Consider the status of the post-Lopez commerce power: more 
constrained than in its mid-twentieth-century heyday,35 certainly, but 
still powerful within its sphere, as the post-Lopez amendment to the 
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 25 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 26 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (upholding 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on taxing power grounds); see also Sissel v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding ACA against Origi-
nation Clause challenge). 
 27 It should be noted that the phrase “the treaty power” refers not to a single enumerated Arti-
cle I power, but to the combination of the president’s power, “by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and Congress’s power to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 28 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 29 See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502–03 (2013); Comstock, 560 U.S. at 142. 
 30 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2076–77 (critiquing this ap-
proach). 
 31 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 32 17 U.S. at 411. 
 33 LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2062 & n.81, 2079 & n.148. 
 34 Id. at 2079 n.148. 
 35 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding production quotas under the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938). 
  
36 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 128:31 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199036 and a host of decisions concerning 
regulations of interstate markets37 demonstrate.  Yet the outer bounda-
ries of the power remain deliberately untested, and its limiting prece-
dents seem to be accorded more than the usual precedential weight.  
This tension in Commerce Clause doctrine stems at least in part 
from recent administrations’ decisions not to press the Court to revisit 
the Lopez and Morrison tests, even in cases where the commerce-
power rationale would seem particularly apt — for example, in connec-
tion with federal criminal statutes.38 
II.  THE TROUBLE WITH LOCALNESS AND HIERARCHY:  
ONE SCALE TOO MANY 
The problems with the hierarchical approach to congressional 
power begin with the fact that it simply is not warranted by the text or 
the structure of the Constitution.  Nowhere does Article I state that 
certain of its clauses are entitled to more judicial deference than oth-
ers.  Moreover, to the extent that the hierarchical approach to congres-
sional power relies on an initial assessment of some elusive degree of 
localness in the underlying activity, it is not clear why a local activity 
regulated under a treaty-implementing statute should be subject to 
greater scrutiny than an equally local activity regulated under the 
commerce power. 
Local power, territory, and even sovereignty are vital and necessary 
parts of a federal union; without a local sphere, a federal union is 
something else entirely — not a federal, but an “incorporating” union, 
to borrow a distinction made by John Witherspoon on the floor of 
the Continental Congress in August 1776.39  The designation of an 
activity or a power as local is thus central to dividing power within a 
federation.  The scope of the federal legislature’s authority is not with-
out limits, but it should not depend on judicial assessments of local-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school 
zone”). 
 37 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding penalties against the production 
and use of home-grown medicinal marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act); cf. 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566 (upholding the individual mandate provision of the ACA  and thus its 
effects on interstate healthcare markets, albeit under the taxing power but not the commerce  
power). 
 38 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (“The Government frequently 
defends federal criminal legislation on the ground that the legislation is authorized pursuant to 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  In this case, however, the Court of Appeals 
held that the Government had explicitly disavowed that argument before the District Court.”); 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 21–22. 
 39 Quoted in John Adams’ Notes of Debates, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 
593 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979). 
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ness.  Bond illustrates the novel and damaging effects of the localness 
and hierarchy inquiries on modern federalism analysis. 
How does this pair of sliding scales appear in the Bond decision?  
First, the Court suggests that if a given allegedly criminal act seems 
local — an attempt to cause a skin rash in a spouse’s new partner, for 
example — then the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
Act presumptively does not cover it.40 
But what if the chemicals Ms. Bond used had traveled in interstate 
commerce, or if their illegal distribution might affect an existing inter-
state market in such compounds?  Surely Congress could criminalize 
Ms. Bond’s conduct under its interstate commerce power — the fount 
of much of federal criminal law dating back to the earliest days of the 
republic — without having to resort to the more cumbersome treaty-
plus-statute mechanism.  Assuming the underlying conduct was eco-
nomic (for example, the purchase of such chemicals in order to poison 
a rival), a federal statute criminalizing such conduct under the  
commerce power would seem unproblematic. 
In short, one can easily imagine a scenario in which congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause would extend to criminalizing the 
local activity at issue in Bond without resorting to the treaty power.  
In other words, if Congress had used a stronger regulatory weapon 
from within its Article I arsenal, it could perhaps have won a more re-
sounding victory in Bond, despite the localness of the underlying activ-
ity.  Given that fact, the Court’s supposedly key analytic factor, local-
ness, cannot bear the weight the Chief Justice’s opinion places on it.  
Judicial assessments of localness do not define the boundaries of Con-
gress’s power under Article I; those boundaries are set forth in the lan-
guage of Article I itself.  However local the doorknob, no one would 
think of pointing to Second Ypres in order to defeat the prosecution of 
an interstate purchaser of poisonous chemicals. 
III.  THE TREATY POWER AS A FEDERATIVE POWER 
The power to conduct external affairs, including the power to enter 
into treaties, is a crucial duty of the central level of government in any 
federal system.  John Locke described it as “the management of the se-
curity and interest of the publick without.”41  The “federative Power,” 
as Locke termed it, comprised the “Power of War and Peace, Leagues 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092 (noting that “the background principle that Congress does not 
normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important.  In light of that prin-
ciple, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal 
prosecution for a chemical weapons attack” and contrasting Bond’s case with the “handful of 
prosecutions” that have been brought under section 229). 
 41 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Commu-
nities without the Commonwealth.”42  For all their chariness toward 
strong federal power deployed domestically, the Articles of Confedera-
tion clearly deposited the full array of external powers in “the United 
States in Congress assembled.”43 
Locke and the Articles are primary sources for the eighteenth-
century view of the purpose of the treaty power.44  But Locke’s theory 
of the federative power is relevant not only for historians or for 
originalists.  It also illustrates the problems with the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the treaty power in Bond.  Those shortcomings are evi-
dent in light of founding-era sources, doctrinal keystones such as 
McCulloch v. Maryland, and pre– and post–New Deal understandings 
of congressional power — in short, the entire sweep of American con-
stitutional law.  The ability to “assume among the powers of the earth, 
[a] separate and equal station” in 1776 included the powers necessary 
to operate as a state on the international stage.45  Even if the Court 
persists in a hierarchical view of the Article I powers, the treaty power 
should be understood as an essential vector of federal authority out-
ward to the arena of nation-states.  The sovereignty claims of the sev-
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 43 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, IX. 
 44 See DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING 23, 154 (2003). 
 45 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
